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Abstract 
 
The establishment of a central bank occurred at very different moments in the process of economic 
integration in the United States and the European Union. In this paper, we go into the first years of 
the Federal Reserve System through the lens of Paul van Zeeland’s PhD dissertation. Paul van 
Zeeland (1893-1973) became the first Head of the Economics Service of the National Bank of 
Belgium in 1921, after his studies in Princeton with Edwin Walter Kemmerer. There are clear 
similarities in their analyses of the Federal Reserve System, for instance in their adherence to the 
gold standard and the real bills doctrine as well as in their emphasis on the elasticity of the money 
supply. Moreover, they shared a view - with hindsight a rather naïve view - that with the Fed in 
place, financial crises would be a distant memory. However, there were also important differences. 
So, van Zeeland, like several other economists as Warburg, accorded greater significance to the 
discount market (a key factor for the international role of the dollar) and to a stronger centralization 
of the Fed (which would be taken up in the 1935 Banking Act). Moreover, very specific for van 
Zeeland is the importance given to the Fed's independence from the State (an element related to 
his continental European background and Belgium's experience of monetary financing during the 
war).  
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 1 
“Is there any country in the world on which it is harder 
to come to a reasoned, comprehensive opinion than 
the  United  States?  I  very  much  doubt  it.  So  many  
disparate elements, sometimes merged, sometimes 
simply juxtaposed; many races, radically different 
climates, vast distances, accumulated wealth, endless 
resources and barely controlled energy: in short, a 
turbulent new world. How can we reach a judgment in 
the face of all that?" (Paul van Zeeland, Quelques 
impressions des Etats-Unis [Some impressions of the 
United States], La Revue Générale, 1922b:194). 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
  As is well known, the establishment of a central bank occurred at very different 
moments in the process of economic and political integration in the United States and 
the European Union. One might argue that the United States, already from its origins, 
from the Declaration of Independence in July 1776, constituted in many ways a federal 
state. The civil war, from 1861 to 1865, confirmed the federal nature of the United 
States, as against the southern confederate view. Still the establishment of a federal 
central bank only occurred in 1913 and the early functioning of the Federal Reserve 
System was not always easy. Moreover, notwithstanding the political union, there 
were important cleavages in the American economy and society, whereby one might 
note certain similarities with the Euro Area. As observed by one of America’s foremost 
economists of the time, the Harvard professor Allyn Young: 
 "So far as finance is concerned the most important cleavage has been 
the one between 'creditor regions', supporters of 'sound money' and of 
an effective centralized control of banking operations, and 'debtor 
regions', partisans of 'cheap money' and advocates of the largest 
practicable degree of freedom in the establishing and operating of 
banks. The recurrent 'cheap money' movements that have characterized 
the political history of the United States have sprung from the fact that 
the opening up and developing of new lands have called for 
expenditures of capital in amounts far beyond the resources of the 
actual settlers. New regions have generally been debtor regions, and 
there is more than mere coincidence in the fact that demands for cheap 
money  have  always  been  voiced  most  loudly  on  the  frontier."  (Young  
1926) 
2 
 In this paper we analyse the establishment and the first years of the Federal Reserve 
System through the lens of Paul van Zeeland’s Ph.D dissertation as well as the analyses of 
his American mentor, Edwin Walter Kemmerer. Paul van Zeeland (1893-1973) was the first 
Head of the Economics Service of the National Bank of Belgium, in 1921. After a brilliant 
career at the Bank, he entered politics. He is especially famous for his time as Prime 
Minister (1935-1937). In 1935, he put an end to the deflation policy in devaluing the 
Belgian franc. Moreover, he introduced radical financial reforms, especially the 
establishment of the Banking Commission for the supervision of banks and the 
introduction of a deposit guarantee system. Walter Lippmann, in the New York Herald 
Tribune of 29 January 1938, described van Zeeland as “perhaps the most efficient, the 
least confused, and the most surefooted of the statesmen who had dealt with the 
depression”. In a 1937 by-election, he soundly defeated Leon Degrelle, the leader of the 
fascist Rex party, effectively stopping the advance of fascism in Belgium. In the post-war 
period,  he  was  Foreign  Minister  from  1949  to  1954,  and  was  renowned  for  his  strongly  
Atlanticist approach towards European integration. 
 Van Zeeland studied in Louvain with A.-E. Janssen and in Princeton with E. W. 
Kemmerer. He wrote a dissertation untitled: La réforme bancaire aux Etats-Unis 
d'Amérique de 1913 à 1921, le système de la réserve fédérale (van Zeeland 1922). Paul 
van Zeeland’s analysis of the early years of the Federal Reserve remains an unstudied 
subject, both in the literature on van Zeeland1 as  well  as  in  studies  on  the  Fed.  Two  
possible  reasons  can  explain  this  neglect  in  the  literature  on  the  Fed:  the  book  was  in  
French  and,  after  its  publication,  van  Zeeland  did  not  publish  articles  on  this  theme  in  
English. 
 The aim of this article is to show the originality of this young Belgian economist’s 
analysis of the Fed, as he draws both from his experience in the US and Belgium. The 
secondary literature, including Mehrling (2002), Dimand (2003), Meltzer (2003) and Wells 
(2004), emphasizes the analysis of many American economists such as Irving Fisher, David 
Kinley, Frank Taussig, Olivier Sprague, James L. Laughlin, Henry Parker Willis, Paul Warburg 
and Benjamin Strong of the early years of the Fed, but do not include any analysis of van 
Zeeland.  We  will  focus  in  particular  on  van  Zeeland’s  originality  as  compared  to  
Kemmerer, his mentor2. 
 In the next section, we study the monetary debates about banking reform in the 
United States before van Zeeland’s arrival and we discuss in particular E. W. Kemmerer’s 
position on the US banking reforms. In the third section, we go into the formation of the 
                                                             
1
 Even the two most prominent biographies, Dujardin and Dumoulin (1997) and Henau (1995), do not go into van 
Zeeland’s analysis of the Fed very much. 
2
 Van Zeeland was not the only Belgian who studied the functioning of the Fed. A few year later, Jean Steels also went 
to the US with a CRB fellowship, studying at Harvard with Allyn Young. His work La banque à succursales dans le 
système bancaire des États-Unis, was published in 1926.  
3 
young  van  Zeeland  and  we  analyse  the  financial  chaos  in  Belgium  after  the  First  World  
War that influenced his monetary thinking. Then, in the fourth section, we contrast 
Kemmerer and van Zeeland’s theoretical arguments and practical recommendations for 
the US Federal Reserve System. As an epilogue we go into van Zeeland's ideas about 
(European) monetary union. We also try to draw some lessons from our analysis for 
Europe’s monetary union. 
 
2. KEMMERER AND US BANKING REFORM BEFORE THE CREATION OF THE FED 
 Edwin Walter Kemmerer (1875-1945) was an eminent economist and academic3. In 
1899 he started a PhD at Cornell University. He chose to work on the quantity theory of 
money (QTM), a choice that would be pivotal for his professional future: Kemmerer was a 
quantity theorist, but also a defender of gold-monometallism, putting him at odds with 
several other quantity theorists who favored bimetallism. One of Kemmerer’s first 
professors of economics, Willard Fisher, was one of the major American bimetallists, and 
like most bimetallists, defended QTM. Jeremiah Jenks, Kemmerer’s PhD adviser, was a 
monometallist and quantity theorist. He strongly influenced Kemmerer who continued to 
work  on  the  QTM  as  his  PhD  thesis  topic,  developing  a  statistical  test  to  prove  its  long-
term validity in the United States between 1879 and 1901. 
 Kemmerer was also an active member of the American Economic Association and 
became its president in 1926. He intervened in many of the monetary debates that took 
place in the US and in the international arena in the last years of the nineteenth century 
and in the first three decades of the twentieth century. Kemmerer was a member of 
commissions dealing with the creation of the Federal Reserve System – particularly the 
Aldrich Commission – and was monetary adviser to different governments in the US and 
abroad. As he contributed to the establishment of five Latin American central banks (in 
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) and to the adoption of the gold standard to 
stabilize exchange rates, he was known as a "money doctor" (Drake 1989). These were key 
reasons why the young Paul van Zeeland decided to pursue his studies with Kemmerer at 
Princeton. 
 Kemmerer had just published the fourth edition of his book entitled The ABC of the 
Federal Reserve System when  van  Zeeland  arrived  at  Princeton  in  19204. This book was 
very successful, with twelve editions in total. The outline of the book was easy: in the first 
part Kemmerer analyzed the four defects of the old National Banking System prior to the 
                                                             
3 
 For a wider analysis of Kemmerer's monetary theory, see Gomez Betancourt (2010a & 2010b). On his biography see 
Gomez Betancourt (2016). 
4
  We  choose  to  quote  here  from  Kemmerer’s  Fourth  edition  of  April  1920  because  this  was  the  edition  used  and  
quoted by van Zeeland in his dissertation. 
4 
creation of the Fed, and in the second part he presented the solution to these problems, 
thanks to the Federal Reserve Act and its later amendments.  
 In 1863, in the midst of the US Civil War, the National Banking System (NBS) was 
established by the Northern states of the federal Union in order to contribute to the war 
financing effort and to strengthen and homogenize the circulation of banknotes. Its aim 
was to provide safety, convertibility and uniformity of paper currency. This system was 
kept on and extended after the Civil War, surviving for 50 years, until the creation of the 
Fed in 1913. 
 The NBS had two main advantages. First, the uniformity of banknotes made forgery 
particularly difficult (only the signature of each bank was different). Second, the issuing of 
banknotes was bond-backed, which meant that US Treasury Bonds guaranteed them. As a 
consequence, these banknotes were credit-risk-free. 
 After the Civil War (1860-1865) the American monetary debates concerned three main 
issues: first, the instability of the price level, second, the recurrent banking crises which 
occurred under the National Banking System and the consequent necessity of a banking 
reform, and third, the choice of the metallic standard (among gold coin standard, 
bimetallism, gold exchange standard, etc.)5. 
 According to Kemmerer’s book ABC of the Fed, the  main  shortcomings  of  the  NBS  
which justified setting up the Federal Reserve were (1) decentralization and the rigidity of 
commercial bank reserves, (2) the inelasticity of banknotes and deposits, (3) the absence 
of  any  organized  system  of  domestic  and  international  transfers  and  (4)  a  constraining  
relationship with the Federal Treasury, due to the absence of a money market which 
would allow banks to place their short-term funds (when banks had surpluses, there was 
no market to place them). There was a broad consensus on the first two points at the time 
among analysts of the Federal Reserve System (like Warburg, Burgess and van Zeeland).  
 Firstly, concerning the decentralization issue, Kemmerer not only worried about the 
absence of responsible national institutions (such as a central bank or genuine national 
banks) for coordinating the US money market like in France or England, but also about the 
problem of scattered and immobile gold reserves. In Kemmerer’s words: “The great 
majority of national banks were national in nothing but name. Most of these banks were 
                                                             
5  In his 1944 book, Kemmerer identified three types of gold standards, which depend on whether all or only some of 
the characteristics defining the GS are present. The first is the Gold Coin Standard (GCS), also called Gold Specie 
Standard (GSS) or Gold Standard (GS). In this system, gold coins circulate within a country, bank notes are 
convertible into gold coins without restriction, and coinage is unlimited at costs generally determined by the law. 
The second type is the Gold Exchange Standard (GES) in which there is neither free coinage of gold nor domestic gold 
coins in circulation, although the latter would not compromise the effectiveness of the mechanism. Currency 
reserves consist of short-term interest-yielding investments in foreign financial markets. The third type is the Gold 
Bullion Standard (GBS). It relies neither on domestic gold circulation, nor on unlimited gold coinage. Gold is stored in 
the issuing bank and only serves to maintain the stability of the exchange rate. Bank notes are convertible only 
above a certain amount (equivalent to a bullion) and exclusively for exportation. 
5 
independent units, each working for itself. There was little teamwork. In times of 
threatened panic the different parts of the system worked at cross purposes”. (Kemmerer 
1920: 3-4). 
 Gold reserves were dispersed throughout the country, difficult to move, and could not 
be easily transferred to regions where they were scarce. According to Kemmerer, this was 
the most serious feature of the decentralization: 
“In America bank reserves were so scattered and so jealously guarded that in 
times of threatened panic they were comparatively ineffective in staying the 
storm. The situation was analogous to what would happen today if after 
drilling our American army to a high point of fighting efficiency, we should 
scatter the men in small units all over the United States to protect the country 
from a threatened invasion. Each community would be jealous of its own 
squad of soldiers, but the invader would come and the efficiency of our well 
drilled  soldiers  would  be  practically  nil.  The  point  of  the  illustration  will  be  
clear to everyone recalling the mad scramble for reserve money on the part of 
banks throughout the country at the time of the panic of 1907. Our supply of 
reserve money was large. In fact we had at that time in the United States the 
largest supply of gold in the world. It was ineffective, however, because widely 
scattered; hence, suspension of cash payments throughout the country, 
currency premiums, the breakdown of our domestic exchanges, the illegal 
issue of millions of dollars of money substitutes, and all the other disgraceful 
accompaniments of an American panic”. (Kemmerer 1920: 6).  
 Paul van Zeeland was on the same line: “The situation has been compared – not 
without  humor  –  to  that  of  a  nation  which  would  have  taken  care  to  form  a  territorial  
army in times of peace but would refrain from using it in times of war, lest all the reserves 
should be lost.” (van Zeeland 1922: 25).  
 Later research (Eichengreen et al. 2014)  has  confirmed  the  importance  of  the  
mutualisation of gold reserves for the cohesion and stability of the US monetary union, 
comparing it, in a certain way, with the TARGET2 system in Europe’s monetary union. 
 Secondly, one of the most important defects of the National Banking System was the 
inelasticity of the supply of money. Kemmerer argued that there was a relationship 
between seasonal variations and the scarcity of currency and credit, leading to an 
instability of interest rates. He attributed this phenomenon to the demand associated with 
harvests and the unresponsive bond-secured currency system (Kemmerer 1911b: 33). As 
early as 1910, Kemmerer wrote a study on the variation of short-term interest rates on 
the money market in the largest American cities. This study showed the weaknesses of the 
National Banking System and advocated a more elastic money and credit system, which 
would allow farmers greater access to credit.  
6 
 These two main problems – the inelastic currency and scattered reserves – largely 
contributed to the 1907 financial panic in the US and the resulting failure of many 
American commercial banks during this period6.  After  the  1907  crisis,  some  economists  
and bankers, namely Vanderlip, Hepburn and especially Warburg, recommended the 
creation of a European-style “central bank” for the US7. In Kemmerer’s view, a central 
bank  was  needed  in  order  to  ensure  the  elasticity  of  money  and  credit,  as  well  as  the  
liquidity of the money market. With a new system, based on the real bills doctrine, the 
central bank could put an end to the considerable and often erratic fluctuations of interest 
rates. Kemmerer advocated the real bills doctrine and believed that money issuing and 
credit allowance should meet the needs of trade.  
 The real bills doctrine, as defended by Kemmerer and also van Zeeland, has been 
severely criticized. According to Mints (1945), "many writers have clearly had no faith in it 
but have failed to state their opposition explicitly. Among those who have done so, the 
analysis of D. H. Robertson merits consideration." (Mints 1945: 260). Not only Robertson 
(1922), but also Lauchlin Currie (1934), Harris (1936), Hawtrey (1924) among others 
criticized the real bills doctrine. The main argument against it was their opposition to tie 
the money supply to short-term assets. In Robertson's words, “money is very much untied 
and runs about the city” (Robertson 1922: 102).   
 According to Mints, “While Lord Keynes has not explicitly criticized the real-bills 
doctrine, it is nevertheless clear that he has no faith in it. He has strongly urged that the 
central bank should be ready to deal in debts of all maturities rather than confine itself to 
those of short term. This is rank heresy to any believer in the real-bills doctrine.” (Mints 
1945: 260).  Mints argues then that, if the central bank operated in this manner, the 
structure of interest rates could be directly affected, whereas under existing practices the 
price of long-term debts is left to be “influenced by belated and imperfect reactions from 
the price of short-term debts”. (Keynes 1936: 206).  
 Kemmerer, as well as van Zeeland and many other (American) economists of that time 
who  supported  the  real-bills  doctrine,  argued  that  an  elastic  currency  was  necessary  to  
meet  the  needs  of  trade  while  restricting  the  banks  to  loans  for  commercial  purposes.  
Kemmerer was worried about the liquidity risk. The way to prevent it was confining 
banking to short-term commercial loans to warrant the liquidity position. Nevertheless, 
despite the criticism, in these years and until the reform of the Banking Act in 1935, the 
                                                             
6
  According to Paul  Warburg (1930,  pp.52-55),  the 1907 crisis  was not the result  of  a lack of  gold in the US,  but the 
distribution of reserves among a very large number of banks that then hoarded gold independently and in self-
interest during the crisis, thus provoking both a shortage of gold and an extended panic. As he said, "the result of our 
system is that our immense quantities of gold and coins remain unused despite the fact that our gold reserves are 
four times greater than England’s, and despite our massive monetary circulation per person of 35 dollars. 
Consequently every year, we suffer from severe currency shortages.” On the decentralization problem in US, see 
also Laughlin (1933) and Rist (1938, p.437). 
7
  Warburg knew continental European central banking very well, also because he was a German immigrant. 
7 
Federal Reserve followed the real bills doctrine. For many later analysts, like Allan Meltzer 
(2003), the real bills doctrine was one of the reasons of the “flawed” Fed policies which 
contributed to the Great Depression (cf. infra). 
 Thirdly, Kemmerer discussed the issues of domestic transfers and the foreign exchange 
dependence. On the subject of domestic transfers, he explained that it was expensive and 
troublesome, requiring heavy shipments of currency back and forth all over the country. 
He wrote: “Many banks imposed exchange charges – some high and some low – for the 
collection of out-of-town checks received over their counters. The length of time in which 
checks  were  in  transit  was  increased  and  the  economic  cost  to  the  community  for  the  
collection of checks was made heavier. One serious phase of the practice of routing checks 
was the manner in which it padded legal reserves". (Kemmerer 1920: 21). 
 A second part of the exchange difficulties under the old banking system concerned 
overseas trade. According to Kemmerer: “our foreign trade was financed largely through 
London. And those parts of the trade which were with the Orient and with South America 
were financed almost entirely through London… The trouble was not that we utilized 
them, but that we utilized them too much and were unduly dependent upon them. This 
involved several difficulties only two of which need be mentioned here. In the first place, 
payments through London gave rise to additional foreign exchange operation, which 
normally added to both the expense and the risk of financing a shipment of goods. In the 
second place, the fact that invoices, bills of lading and other documents passed through 
the hands of foreign banks and of South American or oriental branches of foreign banks 
gave to our foreign competitors "inside" information concerning our foreign business 
information that was often used to their advantage in competition with our own citizens”. 
(Kemmerer 1920: 23-24). 
 Fourthly, the last main problem, according to Kemmerer, was the “defective 
government deposit system”. Indeed, the volume of banknotes that banks could put into 
circulation depended on the amount of federal government bonds they had in their 
portfolio and which secured the banknotes. The bond-secured system, implied that the 
national banks could issue notes upon purchase of certain government securities, mainly 
US government bonds. Consequently, the national banks’ issuing capacity depended on 
the amount of Treasury bonds they had: 
“The relation between our Treasury Department and the national banks 
encourage on the part of banks the practice of depending upon the 
government for aid in times of emergency, and tend to prevent the banks from 
making independently, in advance, proper provision for the regularly recurring 
heavy seasonal demands” (Kemmerer 1911a:  249). 
 Thus, the volume of national banknotes available fluctuated according to the quantity 
of bonds issued and was not related to economic activity.  
8 
 In an attempt to solve this problem, the banking debate participants focused on 
finding an alternative model to the bond-secured currency system.  The  new  model  put  
forward a currency guaranteed by commercial paper, as in many continental European 
countries, according to the “real bills” approach (cf. infra).  
 Oliver  Sprague  (1913)  coined  the  term  “Kemmerer’s  Plan”  of  banking  reform  to  
highlight Kemmerer’s contribution to the banking system debate8. The two original 
aspects of Kemmerer’s plan were: first, he proposed including representatives of all 
sectors of society, looking for more democratic representation on the federal banks’ 
boards and, more broadly, in the monetary policy decision-making bodies, second, he 
argued that the State should guarantee the liquidity of banknotes and the solvency of the 
central bank (even though it was a private capital institution). It was the State’s 
responsibility to ensure the convertibility of the central bank’s notes, as there should be 
total confidence in bank money9.  
 
3. THE FORMATION AND CENTRAL BANKING BACKGROUND OF VAN ZEELAND  
 We do not have any of van Zeeland’s writings pre-dating his studies in Princeton10. In 
order to get an idea about his ideas before he started working on his book on the Federal 
Reserve, we first take a look at his formative years. We then move on to an overview of 
central banking in Belgium in van Zeeland’s times. 
  
                                                             
8
 “Professor Kemmerer is to be congratulated on the plan of organization which he has devised for the control of the 
machinery needed to make possible cooperative action among bankers. He had attacked the chief obstacle, which 
has been encountered in the effort to secure banking reform legislation -the widespread fear that greater power 
over money and credit might be secured by a few banks and bankers in the money centers, and particularly by those 
of  New  York  City.  Professor  Kemmerer’s  plan  has  the  enormous  advantage  of  being  far  more  simple  than  that  
adopted by the National Monetary Commission. Under the plan of the Commission it is most unlikely that control 
would ever be acquired by particular groups or classes of banks; under Professor Kemmerer’s plan this possibility 
would be even more remote. But this is not its chief virtue. It is conspicuously a better plan because it makes more 
obvious, more intelligible, the impossibility of undesirable control over the proposed Reserve Association”. (Sprague 
in Banking Reform Discussion, Kemmerer 1913b: 68).  
9
 Kemmerer, who considered himself as a “progressive” (Republican) in 1913, played an important political part in 
supporting the reforms proposed, on the one hand, by bankers and Republican groups, and on the other hand, by 
the politicians in power at the time, i.e. the Democrats. On Kemmerer’s political position, see Gomez Betancourt 
(2016). 
10
 Neither of the two main biographies of van Zeeland (Dujardin and Dumoulin 1997 and Henau 1995) have any 
information about this. Part of his archives was destroyed in a fire. 
9 
3.1. Van Zeeland’s formation 
 Paul  van  Zeeland  was  born  in  Soignies  on  11  November  1893.  He  studied  Law  and  
Philosophy in Louvain. His studies were interrupted by the First World War (he became a 
German prisoner). After the war, he finished his Law studies and started also with Political 
and Social Sciences studies, which included Economics. As in several other continental-
European countries, courses in Economics were taught in the so-called "Schools of Political 
and Social Sciences", sub-divisions of the Law Faculty. Most professors teaching 
economics had a law background and much emphasis was put on institutional and 
descriptive elements. Van Zeeland also followed courses on money and central banking 
with A.-E.  Janssen,  who was also at  the National  Bank of  Belgium, being a Director from 
1919 to 1925. Janssen quickly became a mentor for van Zeeland.  
 Janssen had obtained degrees in Law and in Political and Diplomatic Sciences at the 
University of Louvain. His doctoral dissertation, "Les conventions monétaires" (Monetary 
unions),  was  a  discussion  of  international  monetary  relations,  from  both  a  legal  and  an  
economic  perspective.  The  main  body  of  the  book  contained  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  
German, Scandinavian and, in particular, Latin monetary union. In his assessment of 
currency unions, he was pessimistic about the latter. He realized that, from the late 19th 
century onwards, nation states increasingly considered monetary matters as an integral 
part of their national sovereignty. Therefore, monetary unions could only survive if they 
were preceded by political unification, a process that was not on the agenda in the early 
20th century  (Janssen  1911:  433-435).  In  a  fifth  chapter,  he  examined  the  then  ongoing  
discussions on international monetary relations. Janssen's perspective was partly 
historical,  but  also  very  forward-looking.  He  took  a  great  interest  in  the  future  
development of the international monetary and financial system: "So we find ourselves in 
the midst of a straightforward case of economic development; ... it has come about by the 
extension of sophisticated means of payment, moving on from coins to the banknote, 
from the banknote to the cheque and through the cheque to transfer and settlement" 
(Janssen 1911: 423). 
 Van Zeeland's later thesis on the Federal Reserve fitted perfectly into Janssen's 
research program on money and central banking (Maes 2010). In his course on "Les 
banques d'émission" (issuing banks), Janssen first discussed several central banks, 
especially  the  Banque  de  France,  the  Bank  of  England,  the  German  Reichsbank,  the  
National Bank of Belgium and the Federal Reserve. Thereafter, he provided a comparative 
analysis of issuing banks, focusing on elements like capital and reserves, the gold and 
silver reserves, the regularization of international payments and the relationship with the 
State and with commercial banks (AEJA, No 525, n.d.). In the following years, van Zeeland 
also gave this course. 
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 The First World War provided the impetus for important changes in Belgian academic 
life (Maes and Buyst 2005). In order to save Belgium from starvation during the German 
occupation, the United States established the Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB). 
After the Armistice, the remaining funds were used to create several educational and 
scientific associations; one of them was the CRB Educational Foundation. The CRB 
awarded "Graduate Fellowships" to enable promising young Belgians to pursue graduate 
studies at top American universities such as Columbia, Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Chicago, 
Stanford or Yale. Paul van Zeeland was among the first group of CRB students in 1920.  
 Van Zeeland went to Princeton, to study Monetary Economics with Kemmerer. In his 
(unpublished) Mémoires, van Zeeland described Kemmerer as, “Petit, mince, tout en nerf, 
ne vivant que pour et par sa science; le meilleur théoricien de la finance que j’aie 
rencontré” (Small, thin, always on edge, living only for and through his science, the best 
finance theorist that I have ever met) (van Zeeland, Mémoires, n.d., I.B., PVZA). As advised 
by Janssen, van Zeeland followed several courses given by Kemmerer. He also wrote a 
paper on “The Financial and Monetary Crisis in Belgium” (Report by Paul van Zeeland, 
1921, PUA). Paul van Zeeland was further influenced by Kemmerer’s close links with the 
Federal Reserve System. During his year in the US, he was an intern at the newly created 
Statistics Department of the New York Fed for the three weeks of the Christmas holidays, 
meeting Benjamin Strong (Paul van Zeeland, Report of the Foundation Scholars, 1921, 
BAEFA).  
 The First World War and the ensuing monetary chaos also pointed up the need for 
economic analysis at the National Bank of Belgium to be reinforced. During Board 
discussions in the National Bank, A.-E. Janssen pleaded for the creation of a real "Service 
d'Etudes Économiques" (Van der Wee and Tavernier 1975).  
 The first economist to be recruited was Paul van Zeeland. Back from Princeton, he was 
taken on as "Conseiller au Service des Etudes Économiques" on 1 October 1921. In May 
1922, van Zeeland received a permanent appointment as Head of the Service d'Études, a 
testament to the profound knowledge he had acquired in the United States, not only of 
monetary economics but also of how economic research at a central bank should be 
organized.  
 He made a quick career at National Bank of Belgium (NBB), becoming Secretary of the 
Bank in 1924, Director in 1926 and Vice-Governor in 1934. He was very closely involved in 
international monetary matters, like the creation of the Bank for International Settlements 
in 1930. He pursued an academic career as well. Together with Albert-Edouard Janssen, he 
became one of the founders of the Institut des Sciences Économiques at the University of 
Louvain in 1928 (Dujardin and Dumoulin 1997). 
 At the NBB, the immediate policy challenge was the stabilization of the Belgian franc. 
A  few  months  after  joining  the  NBB,  in  December  1921,  van  Zeeland  produced  a  note  
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running  to  107  pages  on  the  theme  of  "Inflation et déflation" (Inflation and deflation), 
containing a comprehensive plan to remedy Belgium’s monetary difficulties (NBBA, 
N099/7).  
 Meanwhile, van Zeeland also continued his work on the Federal Reserve System, 
which he had initiated in the United States under the direction of Kemmerer. As 
mentioned above, the topic fitted in perfectly with A.-E. Janssen’s research program on 
issuing banks. His study on the organization and functioning of the Federal Reserve System 
became his Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Louvain, with Janssen as his supervisor 
(van Zeeland 1922). 
 
3.2.  Central banking in Belgium 
 Van Zeeland’s approach towards central banking was naturally shaped by the Belgian 
experience of central banking. The National Bank of Belgium was founded in 1850, after 
banking crises in 1838 and 1848 had led to the suspension of convertibility of the notes of 
the two largest commercial banks and the drying up of discount credits. The National Bank 
was, in essence, an issuing and discount bank (Buyst, Maes et al. 2005). The law founding 
the National Bank gave the Bank three important missions: the issue of banknotes, the 
organization of short-term commercial credit, in particular the rediscounting of 
commercial paper, and the function of State cashier.  
 The National Bank was de facto entrusted with the monopoly for issuing banknotes. In 
order that banknotes would always be convertible into precious metal, the National Bank 
was not allowed to get involved in shareholdings or medium- to long-term lending. In the 
same vein, there were tight restrictions on lending to the State. Frère-Orban, the founder 
of the National Bank, adhered to the “banking principle” (i.e. that the central bank 
accommodates the needs of business by discounting commercial paper), like most central 
banks  on  the  European  continent.  But,  as  observed  by  Kauch  (1950:  81):  “the  lesson  of  
1848 in France had shown that, when applied in full as it had previously been in that 
country, with no minimum cash reserve, no statutory ratio, no ceiling, this principle could 
have unfortunate consequences”. So Frère-Orban introduced a proportional reserve 
system, “while – subject to that proviso – maintaining the principle of transactions in self-
liquidating securities and business needs being met in full.” (Kauch 1950: 81). 
 Originally, banknotes represented claims on metal standard money and were intended 
mainly  to  facilitate  large-value  payments.  At  the  end  of  the  19th century, they became 
more widely established as payment instruments. In 1873, an important step was taken 
along the road towards the Bank becoming a public institution when banknotes were 
made legal tender: henceforward, no-one could refuse to accept payment in banknotes. 
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This made the right of issue even more important. Also, the State appropriated an ever-
increasing proportion of the Bank’s profits, particularly when renewing the right of issue.  
 The large-scale replacement of coins by notes in the monetary circulation led to a 
growing  concentration  of  countries'  stock  of  precious  metal  at  the  central  bank.  So,  the  
National Bank played an ever-growing role in settling the balance of payments, and 
became the custodian of the country’s international payment instruments. As noted by A.-
E. Janssen, this contributed to the growing importance of the "monetary" function of the 
National Bank, as compared to its "credit" function (discount credit) (A.-E. Janssen, 
Comment par une lente évolution la fonction monétaire de l'Institut d'émission est 
devenu dominante, AEJA). 
 The National Bank of Belgium also innovated in accumulating foreign-currency-
denominated assets and using them in foreign exchange market interventions and other 
operations (Eichengreen et al. 2018: 16) 
 The US National Monetary Commission, who prepared the establishment of the Fed, 
also produced a volume on the Belgian central bank in 1910, written by Charles Conant. 
He argued that: “The history of the National Bank of Belgium is of special interest to the 
student of banking systems because of the lateness of its foundation and the ability of its 
founders to garner up the results of the experience of Belgium and of other countries in 
what they conceived to be the best attainable form of organization.” (Conant 1910: 5). He 
further observed that: “The business of the Bank is limited substantially to the discount of 
commercial paper and excludes, except to a limited extent, advances upon securities or 
any other non-commercial asset.” (Conant 1910: 5). This basis of rapidly convertible 
commercial paper was the foundation of the Bank’s note-issuing system. 
 It is further noteworthy that the National Bank of Belgium was a model for the reform 
of the banking system in Japan in 1882. As argued by Count Matsukata, the then Japanese 
Finance Minister:  
"In point of the perfectness of organization and the well-regulated condition 
of business management, the National Bank of Belgium stands highest. This 
fact is due doubtless to the lateness of its founding, which enabled it to 
consider fully the mistakes as well as the successes of older banks. Its 
regulations are for this reason more perfect than those of any others, winning 
highest praises from the financiers of the world ... In the case of a Japanese 
central bank, therefore, no better pattern can be found than the National 
Bank of Belgium" (as quoted in Conant 1910: 12). 
 With the outbreak of the First World War and the invasion of Belgium by Germany in 
August 1914, the convertibility of the banknotes was suspended. The war was a 
catastrophe for the Belgian economy, with manufacturing activity grinding to an almost 
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complete standstill. Moreover, the heavy war levies were largely financed by money 
creation. The increase in liquidity received a further impetus when the German authorities 
started paying in German marks for their purchases in Belgium at a compulsory, 
overvalued, exchange rate. As a consequence of the war, the money supply expanded, 
generating severe inflationary pressures (Buyst and Maes 2007). Furthermore, shortly 
after the Armistice in 1918, the Belgian government decided to exchange all domestic 
holdings of German marks for Belgian francs at the rate formerly imposed by Germany. 
The measure caused a massive fraudulent influx of marks. Naturally, this once again 
increased Belgium’s money supply, with further inflationary consequences.  
 
 
Chart  1  -  Selected  items  of  the  balance  sheet  of  the  National  Bank  of  Belgium,  
 1900-1925 (end of year, millions of Belgian francs) 
 
 
Source: NBB. 
 Albert-Edouard Janssen was one of the first in Belgium to warn against the perils of 
inflation. In 1919, he was a member of the Allied Mission in the United States, where he 
gave a well-documented lecture about Belgium's financial situation (AEJA, No. 639). He 
provided a stringent analysis of the increase in banknotes. He defended the exchange of 
German marks for Belgian franc notes, in order to "revive our industrial life". However, he 
stressed the inflationary dangers of the expansion of money in circulation and the need to 
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bring  it  under  control.  Moreover,  he  was  confident  that  Belgium  would  receive  its  war  
reparations from Germany, even if the timing was "a matter of doubt". It would be a vain 
hope.  
 Van  Zeeland’s  monetary  ideas  in  the  early  1920s  reflected  both  his  Belgian  and  
American formation. Both Kemmerer and Janssen, as so many economists after World 
War One, were in favour of the gold standard and hoped that convertibility could be 
restored quickly. For van Zeeland, like Janssen, there was also the influence of scholastic 
economic thought, which emphasized the economic order and monetary stability11. Van 
Zeeland,  like  Kemmerer  and  Janssen,  was  also  an  advocate  of  the  real  bills  doctrine.  He  
strongly adhered to the view that banknotes had to be covered by gold or short-term 
commercial transactions. He abhorred of banknotes issued by the State, “with no metal or 
commercial basis”. “In this case, the notes are no longer ‘banknotes’ but really ‘paper 
money’. The State does not have the power to create value; this is something that results 
from economic laws that elude the State just like the laws of physics or chemistry." (van 
Zeeland 1921: 7). However, confronted with the monetary chaos after the war, van 
Zeeland needed a theoretical framework to analyse Belgium’s economic imbalances. 
Kemmerer’s quantity theory fitted the picture perfectly12. 
 As head of the Economic Service in the early 1920s, van Zeeland was preoccupied with 
the need to stabilize the Belgian franc in a situation where the National Bank, due to the 
war, had a huge amount of government debt on its balance sheet, a serious burden for 
monetary policy. 
 
4. KEMMERER AND VAN ZEELAND ON THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 
 Van Zeeland's dissertation, La réforme bancaire aux Etats-Unis d'Amérique de 1913 à 
1921, le système de la réserve fédérale, contained a preface by Kemmerer. Kemmerer 
described van Zeeland as: “This special preparation, coupled with his high ability as a 
scholar and with the broad training in economics and finance with which he began this 
work, has enabled him to write a book on the American banking system that is at once a 
comprehensive, sound and critical exposition of American banking.” (Introduction by 
Kemmerer in: van Zeeland 1922: VIII). 
 Before the publication, Kemmerer also read van Zeeland’s manuscript. He sent van 
Zeeland a seven page letter with many detailed remarks and made further annotations on 
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 Louvain was an important center of scholastic economic thought, see  Almodovar and Teixeira 2008. 
12
 Later, van Zeeland would move to more “Keynesian” positions. He would become famous for, as prime minister in 
1935, ending Belgium’s deflation policy with a 28 % devaluation of the Belgian franc (see Gomez Betancourt and 
Maes 2017). 
15 
the  manuscript  (Letter  from  Kemmerer  to  van  Zeeland,  28  December  1921,  EWKA).  He  
had only one general observation: 
"I am greatly pleased with the general character of your study. It appeals to 
me as an excellent exposition and criticism of the main features of the federal 
reserve system, and I think it will  perform a very useful service in bringing to 
the people of France and Belgium a better understanding of our financial 
system – a system so different from the systems of Europe that I fear it is not 
very well understood by many people on the continent." 
 Van Zeeland shared many of Kemmerer’s ideas, in particular about four issues 
associated with the banking reform. First, they were both quantity theorists. Second, they 
both were convinced – based also on Paul Warburg’s analysis – of the importance of the 
elasticity of banking money in order to meet the American demand for money. Third, they 
also agreed on the need for banking reform. Fourth, they were optimistic about the new 
Federal Reserve’s capacity to solve most of the problems of the national banking system. 
 Van Zeeland’s book was more critical than Kemmerer’s towards the National Banking 
System and the Federal Reserve System and put also others accents. Van Zeeland started 
his book with Kemmerer’s four problems: decentralization, inelasticity, transfer and 
Treasury. However, while van Zeeland was clearly strongly influenced by Kemmerer, there 
were also important differences, four of which stand out. First and very significantly is the 
importance that van Zeeland attached to the discount market. Second, the international 
role of the Fed. Third, how the system became more centralized. And fourth, and very 
critically, the need to guarantee the independence of the Fed from the US government, 
very much shaped by van Zeeland’s experience of Belgian central banking during World 
War One and European central banking.  
 Van Zeeland starts with an introduction in which he analyses the situation before 1914 
and the main elements of the Federal Reserve Act. In the second part, he studies the 
different elements making up the system and in a third part he analyses the functioning of 
the system. He concludes with the tendencies for the future of the Federal Reserve 
System and his own appreciation.   
 From  the  outset,  van  Zeeland,  like  Kemmerer,  takes  an  optimistic  view  that  the  
establishment of the Fed has resolved US problems of financial instability: "From now on 
there will no longer be any panics; there is a clear-sighted authority, well-placed and well-
equipped, keeping an eye on things, and taking preventive action in time. If despite 
everything a crisis were to erupt, the banks are no longer in dire streets, but have the 
backing of the entire System behind them, with all its strength, all its resources and all its 
knowledge." (van Zeeland 1922: 71). However, history would prove them wrong.  
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 In his overview of the first years of the functioning of the Fed, van Zeeland emphasized 
the role of the Board and the centralization of the new system. In his view, the Board 
"forms the keystone of the System. It is the central authority, the guiding principle and the 
unifying factor" (van Zeeland 1922: 94). Kemmerer held the same opinion (see Friedman 
and Schwartz 1963)13. 
 In  the  second  part  of  his  book,  van  Zeeland  paid  a  lot  of  attention  to  the  discount  
market. He noted the differences with the system in Europe, where issuing banks discount 
paper from commercial firms, while, in the United States, the Federal Reserve Banks are 
bankers' banks and have no direct relations with the public: "The principal way in which 
the Reserve Banks distribute the credit at their disposal is via discounting. In reality, 
discounting is rediscounting, because they can only include in their portfolio securities 
already endorsed by a "Member Bank". The European central banks, while acting mainly 
as the banks of banks, practice direct discounting, and they receive deposits and open 
accounts  for  individuals.  They  regard  this  approach  as  a  way  of  staying  in  direct  contact  
with the business world, as well as offering greater scope for steering the money market." 
(van Zeeland 1922: 116).  
 As observed by White (2013), most histories of the Federal Reserve did not pay much 
attention to the responsibilities of the Federal Reserve in in the area of banking 
supervision,  even if  this  was in the title  of  the 1913 Federal  Reserve Act:  “To Establish a 
More  Effective  Supervision  of  Banking”.  This  is  also  so  for  van  Zeeland  and  Kemmerer,  
even if van Zeeland (1922: 99-100) discussed it. Indeed the focus of most studies of the 
Fed  was  on  monetary  policy  issues.  This  was  clearly  so  for  van  Zeeland,  who  as  a  
continental European central banker was more accustomed to a model in which central 
banks  were  still  also  competitors  of  commercial  banks  and  who  was  marked  by  the  
monetary disorder of World War One. 
 Van Zeeland, much more than Kemmerer, paid special attention to bankers' 
acceptances, which were virtually unknown in the United States before the Fed: 
"There is another type of commercial bill that the Reserve Banks accept for 
discounting, namely ‘bankers' acceptances’. These are bills of exchange, either 
drawn directly on a bank under a credit facility or any other kind of 
arrangement, or drawn initially on a trader but accepted by a bank under a 
mutual agreement. While ‘trade acceptances’ were rare in the United States 
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 However, as a referee pointed out, while the power base of the Federal Reserve became centralized in the 1920s, 
the centrality of power was with the New York Fed, and especially its President Benjamin Strong, not the Board in 
Washington. 
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before the reform, ‘bankers’ acceptances’ were practically unheard of" (van 
Zeeland 1922: 127-128)14.  
 In fact, throughout his book, van Zeeland is always careful to point out the differences 
and similarities between the United States and Europe. 
 Like Kemmerer, van Zeeland argued that the absence of these financial markets, 
before the establishment of the Federal Reserve had profound consequences, as the 
United States was completely dependent on other financial centers, especially London, for 
financing  its  foreign  trade:  "This  situation  was  open  to  serious  criticism  and  caused  
justifiable complaints. It made US foreign trade dependent on the big European financial 
centers, particularly London: it was through those centers that distant transactions 
between the United States and the rest of the world were financed." (van Zeeland 1922: 
127-128). 
 A difference between them concerned the international dimension of the new Federal 
Reserve. Van Zeeland devoted a whole chapter to the Fed and international finance. He 
described how, before 1914, the US financial markets were rather small from an 
international perspective. As is well known from the literature, deep and liquid financial 
markets are a crucial determinant of international currencies, together with the size of the 
economy and monetary and financial stability (Eichengreen 2011). Van Zeeland 
understood this crucial link between strong and well-developed financial markets and the 
international role of a currency only too well: "some Americans dreamt of at least giving 
New York an honorable position in world finance and emancipating US foreign trade to 
some extent. First it was necessary to create, i.e. develop, a domestic bill discount market 
so that bills denominated in dollars could be traded at any time." (van Zeeland 1922: 243). 
 Van Zeeland further emphasized the crucial role of the Federal Reserve in the 
development of the discount market: "Bills of exchange rapidly became part of business 
practice, and by means of the rediscounting mechanism offered by the Reserve Banks an 
active discount market in dollar-denominated bills was created within a few years." 
(van Zeeland 1922: 244). Later research (Eichengreen et al. 2018: 63) also stressed the role 
of the Fed as market maker in the discount market. 
 This emphasis on the development of the discount market and the international role 
of the US dollar marked a difference of van Zeeland’s writing, compared to Kemmerer’s, 
even  if  this  point  was  also  made  by  several  other  authors,  like  Warburg  (who  had  
contributed the volume on the discount system in Europe to the National Monetary 
Commission). It can probably be attributed to van Zeeland’s European background, which 
made him more sensitive to the international dimension of what was happening in the 
                                                             
14  Eichengreen et al. (2018) also very much stress the importance of a market in bankers' acceptances for the rise of 
the US dollar as an international currency. 
18 
United States and its impact on the world scene. It followed on from van Zeeland's 
comparative perspective, always looking at the differences and similarities between the 
United States and Europe. Moreover, van Zeeland spent his 1920 Christmas break at the 
New  York  Fed,  which  was  very  closely  involved  in  the  financial  markets15. Its Governor, 
Benjamin Strong, was very active in developing the acceptances market and strengthening 
the international role of the dollar (Eichengreen 2011: 29). 
 While van Zeeland clearly understood that, with the Federal Reserve and the First 
World War, the international financial scene was changing, he still believed in the 
superiority of London as a financial center: "It is true that much has already been done to 
develop the financial influence of the United States in the outside world. The legal means 
exist. The war enabled the Americans to make considerable progress down that road. Yet 
the superiority of London in this field is not at all shaken, and despite keeping its distance 
from precious metals, the pound sterling is still the leading international unit of currency, 
way ahead of the gold dollar". In a footnote, he continues: "In an article in The Times (16 
September 1920), Otto H. Kahn recognizes that in these terms: It is vain to assert that we 
are in the process of replacing England as an international financial center. England’s 
traditional position is the outcome of geographical, economic and psychological factors, 
racial qualities and centuries of experience." (van Zeeland 1922: 256). 
 In his conclusion, van Zeeland, sketches out his ideas about the future of the Fed and 
presents his own appreciation of the Fed. Kemmerer (letter to van Zeeland of 28 
December 1921, EWKA) called this chapter "particularly good".  
 Van Zeeland, like Kemmerer, emphasized the stabilizing role of the Federal Reserve for 
the US economy: "Under the thoughtful guidance of the Reserve Board, the system 
became  what  it  was  intended  to  be:  the  financial  market  regulator.  The  key  stabilizing  
influence in the economic life of the United States." (van Zeeland 1922: 259). He further 
emphasized how the System has become more centralized, even if this was not the 
original intention. The authors of the 1913 Federal Reserve Act “had deliberately laid 
down the principles and had expected them to evolve. But there was another principle 
that they had not foreseen, the seed of which was contained in the Act, unbeknown to 
them: the tendency towards ever-increasing and ever more effective centralisation." (van 
Zeeland 1922: 265). For van Zeeland, the reforms had succeeded in creating a financial 
market for the United States as a whole, a strong contrast with the earlier fragmentation:  
"It happens that, by force of circumstances and by the effect of the Act’s 
guiding principles themselves, the autonomy of the Reserve Banks was steadily 
demolished. It was inevitable. The main purposes of the Act, such as the 
reorganization of the country’s reserves, the reform of the currency 
                                                             
15  In a letter of 19 December 1920 to Kemmerer, van Zeeland writes that he "could not have found a better manner of 
spending my vacations" (EWKA). 
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circulation, the creation of a national cheque clearing institution, and the 
rationalization of the money market, all require a policy on a national scale; 
real barriers creating arbitrary divisions within the country would be 
impenetrable  obstacles.  For  example,  let  us  suppose  that  there  is  ample  
money in the West and, owing to the selfish opposition of a Reserve Bank, it is 
impossible to make that surplus available to the East, which is suffering a 
temporary  crisis:  what  use  would  the  Reform  have  been  in  that  case?"  (van  
Zeeland 1922: 265-266). 
 Van Zeeland's optimistic view had quite a few similarities with the early years of the 
euro, marked by a strong belief that the euro itself would further financial integration. 
With  hindsight,  van  Zeeland's  assessment  of  the  Fed,  like  Kemmerer's  and  many  others,  
was far too optimistic. In the ensuing years, financial crises would further hamper the 
United States. Several elements can account for this. 
 Firstly, as observed by Goodhart (1969: 3), Kemmerer, as well as van Zeeland, did not 
make a distinction between cyclical and seasonal variations:  
"No  work  on  cyclical  variations  was  presented  to  the  National  Monetary  
Commission. Moreover, financial crises and seasonal variations were not 
considered to be separate phenomena. Financial crises were attributed, with a 
great deal of truth, not so much to cyclical factors as to the natural results of 
the recurring autumnal pressures upon the money market; these seasonal 
pressures were so extreme that it took only a little extra strain – in the form of 
overheated boom conditions or the bursting bubbles of Wall Street 
speculation – to turn tightness into distress. The Federal Reserve System, 
whatever is  required of  it  today,  originally  was brought into existence not to 
provide anti-cyclical monetary management but simply to prevent the regular 
seasonal swings in liquidity." (Goodhart 1969: 3). 
 Secondly, especially in times of tension, the flaws in the Federal Reserve's institutional 
structure and regional tensions would come to the fore. It would, at times, lead to serious 
debates on the setting of the discounts rates by the Federal Reserve Banks. Probably the 
most serious disagreement occurred in June 1933, when the Chicago Fed refused to buy 
Government securities from the New York Fed, leaving the newly elected President, 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, no choice but to declare a bank holiday (Eichengreen et al. 
2014: 15). This would give the impulse to the 1935 Banking Act and the creation of the 
Federal Open Market Committee, a crucial step in the centralization of decision making at 
the Fed. The US experience showes thus that monetary and financial integration is not an 
easy process. 
 Thirdly, also the Fed's policies during the Great Depression were seriously criticized. 
Meltzer, in the official history of the Federal Reserve System, is very hard: "Failure to act 
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during the Great Depression was the Federal Reserve's largest error, but far from its only 
one. Failure to expand can be explained as the result of prevailing beliefs about the 
inevitability of a downturn following the stock market boom. Nothing in theory or central 
banking  practice  can  explain  why  the  Federal  Reserve  did  not  respond  to  the  failure  of  
thousands of banks. Most of the banking failures from 1929 to 1932, and the final collapse 
in the winter of 1933, could have been avoided. The failing banks included many member 
banks. After years of recession, banks had little eligible paper to borrow against. The 
Federal Reserve, following the real bills doctrine, saw no reason to expand.” (Meltzer 
2003: 728-729). For Meltzer, an important culprit was the real bills doctrine, “a destructive 
and mistaken interpretation of banking theory”. He emphasises further the importance of 
ideas: “The original Federal Reserve Act wrote the real bills doctrine into law. At the 
Federal Reserve Board, and at several reserve banks, officials followed this doctrine. They 
considered  real  bills  –  commercial  credit  –  to  be  the  only  correct  foundation  for  credit  
expansion. If banks did not borrow, they believed it was wrong to expand credit. This 
policy gives rise to procyclical policy action: credit and money expand when output 
expands and contract when output contracts. The gold standard, too, makes policy action 
procyclical." (Meltzer 2003: 729)16.  
 A main difference between van Zeeland and his American mentor was the necessity to 
guarantee the independence of the Fed from the US government. Van Zeeland warned 
against the strong position of the government in the decision-making process of the 
Federal Reserve System, with the consequent threats to monetary and financial stability, 
"the danger is real: it is certainly a weakness of the new regime that the function of 
preventing excessive expansion of the financial system is placed solely in the hands of an 
institution of government origin, without any automatic restraint against that tendency" 
(van Zeeland 1922: 167).  
 For van Zeeland, marked by the continental European tradition of central banking and 
by Belgium's wartime experience and the ensuing financial chaos, the main weakness of 
the Federal Reserve System was the strong influence of the Federal government in the 
Federal Reserve Board: 
"Who can fail to see the danger in such a situation? In general, the System is 
exposed to the drawbacks that threaten any State Bank. Political interference 
in the financial conduct of the institution, confusion between the credit of the 
State and that of the Bank, undue pressure by the State to obtain excessive aid 
from the Bank, etc. In the United States, perhaps more so than elsewhere, 
these are menacing drawbacks." (van Zeeland 1922: 269). 
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 In practice, during the Great Depression, the Fed also moved away from the real bills doctrine by operating much 
more with government securities as collateral and, subsequently, the direct purchase of government securities. 
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 In van Zeeland's view, it was crucial to strengthen the centralization and independence 
of the Fed: “Would it not be infinitely preferable to recognize the true character of the 
role played by the Reserve Board, and reform its organization so as to avoid the criticisms 
and disadvantages resulting from its current form of constitution? Since it is ultimately the 
Reserve Board that holds, for the entire United States, the eminent position which had 
been attributed to each Reserve Bank in its own district, why not establish it according to 
the same principles that were applied in setting up the Management Boards of the 
Reserve Banks, namely: 1) Essential independence 2) Limited government control 3) 
Representation of the various business groups 4) Authority in the hands of those 
representatives?" (van Zeeland 1922: 272). For Kemmerer, no any one group of interest 
must control monetary policy. It was important for all sectors (industrial, commerce and 
specially farmers) to be represented on the Board of this independent banking system, but 
it is the State that should guarantee the confidence in bank money.  
 Van Zeeland's plea for central bank independence was in line with ideas in Europe. The 
first post-war financial conference, organised by the League of Nations in Brussels in 1920, 
also called for central bank independence. When discussing the monetary chaos after the 
war and the requests for monetary financing by governments, the Commission for 
Monetary Circulation and Exchange Rates advanced a resolution: “Banks and especially 
issuing banks should not be under any political influence and should only be managed 
under the inspiration of the principles of a vigilant financial policy” (Conférence Financière 
Internationale 1920: 18). The conference unanimously adopted this resolution. One year 
later, in early 1921, Bank of England Governor Montagu Norman tabled some resolutions 
to be adopted by the central banks. This is considered as “a kind of central bank 
manifesto” (Toniolo 2005: 19). The first point stressed the independence of the central 
banks: “Autonomy and freedom from political control are desirable for all Central and 
Reserve Banks” (Sayers 1976: Appendix 10). Also the 1922 Genoa conference concluded 
that banks of issue "should be free from political pressures, and should be conducted 
solely on lines of prudent finance" (Report of the Financial Commission of the Genoa 
Conference, reprinted in Federal Reserve Board 1922: 678). 
 Naturally, central bank independence will always be a sensitive issue, as central banks 
are responsible for crucial public functions, especially with respect to monetary and 
financial stability and the payments systems. Van Zeeland approached central bank 
independence from a very different perspective from most American economists. In the 
United States, many feared a Fed dominated by commercial bankers, in particular the 
powerful east-coast financial community. This made a dominant position for the 
government much more acceptable. Van Zeeland feared State control of the central bank, 
given also the dramatic experience of monetary financing during World War One. 
 As mentioned, with the 1935 Banking Act, an important step towards centralization 
was taken, especially with the creation of the Federal Open Market Committee. Moreover, 
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the Treasury Secretary and the Comptroller of the Currency, who, initially, were members 
of the Federal Reserve Board, were removed from the Board, a step increasing the 
independence of the Fed from the government. As observed by Meltzer (2003: 415), “The 
Banking Act of 1935 permanently changed the Federal Reserve’s structure and laid the 
foundation for the post-war Federal Reserve System. Out went the legal basis for 
semiautonomous, regional banks, each controlling its own portfolio. Reorganization 
shifted power and authority over the reserve banks to the Federal Reserve Board in 
Washington, where it remained. Although the Treasury controlled most decisions until 
after  World  War  II,  the  1935  Act  made  possible  the  centralized  system  that  developed  
once the Federal Reserve became free to pursue an independent policy.” 
 
5. EPILOGUE: VAN ZEELAND, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM AND EUROPEAN (MONETARY) UNION 
 After the Second World War, Paul van Zeeland was very closely involved in the process 
of European integration. Together with the Pole Joseph Rethinger, he was the founder of 
the European League for Economic Cooperation (Dumoulin and Dutrieu 1993). The League 
was one of the European movements at the basis of the Congress of Europe held in The 
Hague,  on  7-11  May  1948,  a  meeting  of  crucial  importance  in  the  process  of  post-war  
European integration. Van Zeeland became the Chairman of the Congress’s Economic 
Commission. 
 As early as the interwar period, van Zeeland had acquired a strong reputation in the 
international arena. In April 1937, when he was still Belgian Prime Minister, he was asked 
by the French and British Governments to make a report on what could be done to reduce 
the  barriers  to  international  trade  and  promote  general  prosperity  (van  Zeeland  1938).  
Many of his later ideas were already evident in this report. 
 While van Zeeland strongly favoured European economic integration, he should not be 
considered as a European federalist, but as a “confederalist” (Dujardin and Dumoulin 
1995). Van Zeeland exposed his ideas on many occasions. A good overview can be found 
in  a  lecture  “La Belgique et l'Occident Européen” given in Paris in 1945. Van Zeeland 
emphasised the Nation State as the basis of the international order, while at the top 
should be a Universal League. In his view, Europe was one of the “intermediary organs”: 
“At the bottom, the Nation State. 
At the top, a Universal League. 
Between the two, the intermediary organs, which must ensure the balance 
and stability of the international body politic. Among these intermediary 
organs, two types can be distinguished. 
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The first could be described as 'vertical' or 'functional'. They have functions or 
tasks to perform that transcend all borders, national and regional, but which 
are constrained by their purpose for example, those that fall to the 
International Court of Justice, the Bank for International Settlements, etc. 
The other type, by contrast, have a 'horizontal' character: they are regional 
groupings. When we talk about a 'region', this word should be given the 
broadest, most comprehensive interpretation possible, so as to encompass not 
only the consequences of geographical proximity, but also all the affinities that 
tend to bring men closer to each other. Spiritual affinities often constitute 
motives or levers at least as efficient as the most active material interests. … 
In  short,  we  might  think  of  the  regional  grouping  as  a  stage  and  a  means  
towards universalism.” (van Zeeland 1945: 12-13).  
 Van Zeeland further stressed very much the notion of national sovereignty: “the 
Nation State is still alive, autonomous, master of its destiny. But, using its rights and 
accepting its obligations, it delegates certain powers to entities to which it is an integral 
part,  and  that  perform  tasks  from  which  it  will  benefit  itself.”  (van  Zeeland  1945:  33).  
Later, as Belgian Foreign Minister from 1949 to 1954, he appeared reluctant towards 
European political union. Pierre Uri, one of Monnet’s trusted lieutenants, characterised 
him as “a gravedigger of the political Community” (Dujardin and Dumoulin 1995: 197). 
 On the economic plane, van Zeeland argued that the European region should become 
a customs union and a monetary union: “In the current circumstances, I think a regional 
grouping, to attain all these, economic, objectives, must go straight for radical solutions; 
that is, as far as a customs union and monetary union.” (van Zeeland 1945: 19).  
 Especially with the hindsight of the euro area crisis, it might seem rather naïve to think 
that  a  monetary  union  could  be  sustainable  without  an  economic  union.  However,  van  
Zeeland was probably thinking more in terms of a gold standard regime, which one might 
describe as a monetary union with several Nation States and central banks17. 
 It is remarkable that van Zeeland had already been criticised on this issue much earlier, 
in May 1942, when, as Chairman of the Belgian Commission for Post-war Reconstruction, 
he had presented Belgium’s peace aims at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York 
(Belgian Peace Aims, PVZA, Archives de l’UCL, FD Cehec A19, n°313). 
 In his presentation in New York, he emphasised that organisation on the regional level 
would have to start with the establishment of a monetary and customs union. Regarding 
the functioning of a monetary union, he referred to the US Federal Reserve System: 
                                                             
17
 As in his report on the reduction of barriers to trade (van Zeeland 1938: 94). 
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“Similarly, a single monetary system would be set up. The several states might retain their 
national banks, but these would become subject to the control of a regional organization. 
They would occupy a position somewhat like distinct Federal Reserve Banks in the United 
States with the regional body serving as a sort of Federal Reserve Board.” 
 His ideas about monetary union were received very critically by his public in New York. 
A  crucial  issue  was  whether  a  monetary  union  could  function  without  centralised  
monetary decision-making and an economic and political union. “Mr. Altschul questioned 
whether it would be possible to prevent one or another of the national banks from doing 
something  which  would  be  harmful  to  the  banks  of  cooperating  countries  unless  there  
should be some sort of real political authority to back up the central board.” In his 
reply, van Zeeland argued for central bank independence. In his view, the central banks 
would have to be separated from national treasuries. Moreover, he emphasised the need 
for good faith among the different actors: “The central board rather than the governments 
of member states would determine the policies to be followed. If conditions should arise 
which would make it desirable for one bank to increase its notes, or to adopt some other 
relief measure, the board would doubtless agree to such a course. One has to assume a 
certain amount of good faith on the part of all parties concerned. Without good faith no 
sort of cooperation would be possible.” However, many interlocutors were sceptical that 
“good faith” would be enough: “Mr. Diebold expressed the view that while it might be 
possible  to  rely  on  good  faith  to  keep  the  several  banks  in  line  in  the  great  majority  of  
cases, in some it probably would not. It then would be necessary to have a supra-national 
political authority with adequate power to enforce the decisions of the central board. 
Mr. Shuster agreed, especially since in the case of many regional formations there would 
be wide differences (cultural, economic, political, etc.) between the component states. 
Mr. van Zeeland admitted that friction would be inevitable. But this, he said, could be 
overcome.”18 
 So, van Zeeland’s proposals for European monetary union seem not to be on the same 
line as his earlier analysis of the Federal Reserve System. There, van Zeeland had argued, 
approvingly, that there was a centralising tendency in the Federal Reserve System, 
something he was much more ambiguous about for Europe. 
 In his capacity as President of the European League for Economic Cooperation and as 
Belgian Foreign Minister, from 1949 to 1954, van Zeeland played an important role in the 
process of European economic integration in the post-war period, even though he was 
very much against a political union. What was of crucial importance for the Belgian 
statesman was cooperation between Europe and the United States. Van Zeeland was one 
                                                             
18
 So, in terms of the (later) monetarist-economist controversy about European monetary integration, van Zeeland 
took a very monetarist position, as he was in favour of a monetary union without an economic union and without a 
mechanism for the coordination of  economic policies (for overviews of  the monetarist-economist controversy see 
Maes 2002 and 2004). 
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of the fiercest advocates of a strong Atlantic dimension to European integration, the roots 
of which go back to his studies in the United States. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 The establishment of a federal central bank occurred at very different moments in the 
process of economic and political integration in the United States and the European 
Union. While the United States, already from its origins in 1776, constituted in many ways 
a federal state, the Federal Reserve System was only established in 1913. By contrast, the 
European Central Bank was established in 1998, when the process of economic and 
political integration was less well advanced. Notwithstanding these differences, both 
policy-makers and academics have been active in “drawing lessons” from the United 
States’ experience for Europe’s economic and monetary union (see, e.g., Butzen et al., 
2014 or Gaspar, 2015). In this paper, we would also like to draw some lessons from the US 
experience, focusing on the establishment and early years of the Federal Reserve System 
through the lens of the analyses of two eminent economists: Paul van Zeeland and Edwin 
W. Kemmerer. 
 The focus of this paper was on Paul van Zeeland’s 1922 analysis of the early years of 
the  Federal  Reserve  System,  in  comparison  with  his  American  mentor  Edwin  Walter  
Kemmerer – the money doctor and money theoretician. The article points up a neglected 
analysis of the Federal Reserve by this Belgian economist. This is all the more important as 
there are only very few examples of analyses of the Federal Reserve System coming from 
non-American economists. This one is even more interesting as van Zeeland was close to 
the American debates and protagonists. The study also fills a gap in the work of Paul van 
Zeeland, who went on to become Prime Minister of Belgium in the 1930s. While he has 
been the topic of much literature in Belgium, his analysis of the Federal Reserve System 
has been largely neglected.  
 There are clear similarities in the analyses of both men, for instance in their adherence 
to the gold standard and real bills doctrine, as well as in their emphasis on the elasticity of 
the money supply. Moreover, they shared a view, with hindsight a rather naïve view, that, 
with the Fed, financial crises would be a thing of the past. However, there were also 
important differences. Van Zeeland, like several other economists as Warburg, accorded a 
greater significance to the discount market (a key factor for the international role of the 
dollar) and to a stronger centralization of the Fed (which would be taken up in the 1935 
Banking Act). Moreover, van Zeeland singled out the importance of the Fed's 
independence from the State (an element related to his continental European background 
and Belgium's experience of monetary financing during the war).  
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 The early experience of the establishment and functioning of the Federal Reserve 
System clearly showed that monetary and financial integration is not an easy process, with 
many hidden difficulties on the way. Even if there was a US political union, the Federal 
Reserve System went through several crises, which revealed flaws in its initial institutional 
set-up. The institutional architecture of the Fed was therefore strengthened over time. 
This  should  be  a  further  spur  to  achieve  a  “Genuine  Economic  and  Monetary  Union”  in  
Europe,  as  well  as  to  increase  the  resilience  of  Europe’s  economies.  We  further  
highlighted the (naïve) optimism of van Zeeland and Kemmerer that, with the Federal 
Reserve System in place, financial crises would be a memory of the past. This should be an 
extra reason for policy-makers in Europe not to be complacent, as the experience of the 
Fed has shown the inherent fragility of the financial system. Policy-makers can never rest 
on their laurels, they always have to remain vigilant. 
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